Roman Gotsiridze: “Georgia’s economy has become tied to Russia.”
Verdict: FactCheck leaves Roman Gotsiridze’s statement WITHOUT VERDICT.
Trade between Georgia and Russia increased by 55% between 2021 and 2024 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The main reason behind this shift was a rise in imports of oil products and natural gas. Both the volume and price of imported goods grew along with Georgia’s proportional reliance on these resources.
Whilst direct exports to Russia rose by only 5% over three years, exports to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan surged by 795% and 4,100%, respectively – mainly due to the re-export of light vehicles. Considering the unnatural rate of growth, it is reasonable to assume that Russia is the final destination for these cars.
Russia has held a significant share in Georgia’s agricultural exports even prior to the war. This dependence has deepened further since then, particularly for wine and spirits, with reliance for fruit and vegetables now exceeding 80% – in some cases, even 90%.
Russian IT companies have also contributed to boosting Georgia’s GDP growth; however, the exact scale of their impact is difficult to determine.
Although economic ties between the two countries have clearly intensified, there is a distinction between increased dependence and critical dependence that amounts to economic alignment. Since it is impossible to precisely assess the scale and nature of this reliance based on publicly available information, FactCheck left Roman Gotsiridze’s statement WITHOUT VERDICT.
Analysis
Member of 10th convocation parliament, Roman Gotsiridze, commented on Georgia’s economic ties with Russia during TV Formula’s programme Gaighvidze Sakartvelo (Wake Up, Georgia), stating: “Georgia’s economy has become tied to Russia… We are paying around 700 to 800 million just for gas and fuel.”
Russia ranked fourth amongst Georgia’s export destinations, third in imports and second in total trade turnover as of 2024. The trade balance is negative – imports from Russia are nearly three times higher than exports to Russia.
Trade with Russia increased sharply following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, mainly driven by imports. Georgian exports to Russia grew by only 5% in 2022 as compared to 2021 whilst imports from Russia surged by 79%. These figures remained largely unchanged in 2023-2024.
Graph 1: Trade Turnover with Russia (USD Million)
Source: National Statistics Office of Georgia
The sharp rise was driven primarily by oil products. Whilst global oil prices rose after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian fuel became relatively cheaper, making it a more attractive option for Georgian importers.
In simpler terms, Georgia bought a larger volume of fuel from Russia and paid a higher price for it in 2022. Namely, Georgia imported 225,000 tonnes of oil products worth USD 135 million from Russia in 2021, paying an average of USD 600 per tonne. The volume then rose to 658,000 tonnes worth USD 622 million in 2022 – with the average price reaching USD 945 per tonne.
Graph 2: Oil Product Imports from Russia
Source: National Statistics Office of Georgia
Similarly, Georgia’s natural gas imports from Russia have doubled in recent years – rising from USD 71 million to USD 145 million. Imports of rebar also grew sharply, reaching USD 114 million by 2024 from virtually zero in 2021.
Whilst Imports of wheat and oil remained largely unchanged and imports of coke, bottles and fresh meat increased, the main drivers of the overall import growth were still oil products and natural gas.
Russia’s share in Georgia’s oil product imports rose from 16.4% in 2021 to 47% in 2022, then declining to 40% by 2024.
Given transportation challenges and past experience (the suspected pipeline sabotage in the North Caucasus in January 2006 that cut off Georgia’s gas supply), the natural gas market may be a more meaningful indicator of reliance. Russian gas accounted for 15% of Georgia’s total consumption in 2021 (397 million m3 out of 2,591 million m3). The aforementioned share had risen to 25% by 2024 (788 m3 out of 3,114 million m3).
Graph 3: Natural Gas Imports
Source: Georgian National Energy and Water Supply Regulatory Commission
Measured by value, Russia’s share of Georgia’s gas imports increased from 22% to 37%. This gap is explained by different pricing structures: Azerbaijani gas is cheaper than Russian gas under transit and other bilateral agreements. Russian gas competes only in the commercial sector whilst households and thermal power plants are supplied by Azerbaijani gas.
Imports of liquefied gas from Russia remain relatively low but grew from USD 2.5 million to USD 22 million between 2021 and 2024, representing an increase from 3,900 to 36,000 tonnes by volume. Nearly 100% of Georgia’s liquefied gas imports came from Russia in both 2021 and 2024.
Although exports to Russia did not rise significantly after the war began, Georgia has maintained a high – or very high – degree of dependence on Russia for certain agricultural products and in some cases that reliance has even grown.
Russia accounted for 60% of Georgia’s wine exports in 2019, 55% in 2021 and 64% in 2022, subsequently reaching 66% by 2024 – the highest level since the embargo was lifted.
Russia’s share of Georgia’s spirits exports has also increased since the war began, rising from 26% to 34% and then to 54%.
Georgia’s export dependence on Russia is particularly high for several agricultural products as of 2024: for peaches 94% of exports (USD 26.3 million out of USD 27.9 million) go to Russia; the share is 86% for cranberries, blueberries and other berries (USD 5.6 million out of USD 5.9 million); for mandarins the share constitutes 79%, apples – 95% (USD 5.6 million out of USD 5.9 million) and plums – 98% (USD 5.5 million out of USD 5.6 million).
Russia accounted for 14.4% of Georgia’s total exports in 2021 – a share that fell to 10.4% by 2024, primarily due to a sharp increase in re-exports to Central Asian countries.
Unlike total exports, Russia’s share in domestic exports (total exports excluding re-exports) increased from 17% to 21.8% between 2021 and 2024, suggesting that more than one-fifth of Georgia’s locally produced goods are sold to Russia.
Graph 4: Exports to Russia (USD Million)
Source: National Statistics Office of Georgia
What is happening in other areas? Foreign direct investment from Russia rose from USD 88 million to USD 109 million and then to USD 117 million between 2022 and 2023 before falling to USD 71 million in 2024. Russia’s share in total foreign direct investment did not increase as compared to 2021.
Remittances from Russia grew fivefold in the first year of the war. Whilst Russia’s share of remittances had fallen from 54% to 18% between 2013 and 2021, it rebounded to 47% in 2022. The aforementioned peak was short-lived – Russia’s share had dropped to 16% by 2024, placing it third after the US and Italy.
Russia’s share in visitor arrivals was 19% in 2019, 23.1% in 2022 and 22% in 2024. One reason for the increase was Azerbaijan’s decision to keep its land border closed. Azerbaijan’s share fell from 19.8% in 2019 to just 3.4% in 2024. Although the total number of Russian visitors did not grow as compared with the pre-pandemic period – 1.47 million in 2019 to 1.42 million in 2024 – a significant share stayed in Georgia for over a year. As of 30 June 2025, 20% of Russian citizens in Georgia had been residing for more than a year according to the National Bank. Revenue from Russian tourists accounted for 23.7% in 2019, rising to 25.3% in 2022 before falling to 19.2% in 2024. However, Russia maintained its leading position. Spending by foreign residents staying long-term is not included in these calculations according to the IMF methodology.
There are also indirect connections beyond direct links. Passenger cars to Central Asian countries – particularly Kyrgyzstan – have grown at an unnatural pace since the start of the war. Exports to Kazakhstan rose by 795% by 2024 as compared with 2021 – from USD 96 million to USD 860 million – and to Kyrgyzstan by 4,100% – from USD 31 million to USD 1.3 billion. Passenger cars hold the highest share amongst the aforementioned exports.
Two factors can explain this growth: first, Georgia may have replaced Russia in car re-exports, supplying vehicles that previously entered Russia from Europe or the US; second, Russia may be the final destination for these cars. Considering Kyrgyzstan’s economic capacity (it is smaller than Georgia and has a lower GDP per capita), the second scenario seems more likely. It is worth noting that this arrangement does not constitute sanctions violation for Georgia as car exports are prohibited in Russia but not Kyrgyzstan.
Despite direct exports to Russia increasing only marginally after the war, which is well within the bounds of natural growth, there is a high chance that indirect growth has been much larger.
Whilst the information and communications sector accounted for 3.9% of Georgia’s GDP before the war began, this share had risen to 6.8% by 2024. A total of 7,093 Russian companies were registered in Georgia before 2022 but their number grew by 26,932 between 2022 and 2023 according to data obtained by the IDFI. The IDFI’s research shows that the main activity of these companies is in the IT sector.
Annual economic growth did not exceed 6.1% prior to the Russia-Ukraine war (with 2021 as an exception due to a high base effect following the previous year’s decline). Whilst the average GDP growth from 2013 to 2019 was 4.7%, it doubled to 9.4% between 2022 and 2024.
Georgia’s imports of oil products, natural gas and liquefied gas from Russia totalled USD 684 million which is very close to the USD 700 million figure cited by Roman Gotsiridze. As for Georgia’s economic ties to Russia, these connections have clearly intensified: imports – including energy imports – have grown significantly and domestic exports have also increased. Indirectly, re-exports have risen sharply and Russian companies have contributed to accelerating the GDP growth. However, there is a distinction between increased dependence and critical dependence that amounts to economic alignment. Since it is impossible to precisely assess the scale and nature of this reliance based on publicly available information, FactCheck left Roman Gotsiridze’s statement WITHOUT VERDICT.
