Nikoloz Samkharadze: “Lithuania was pressuring us to sanction Russia, all whilst selling more wine to Russia than Georgia.”
Verdict: FactCheck concludes that Nikoloz Samkharadze’s statement is HALF TRUE.
Georgia exported USD 168 million worth of wine to Russia whilst Lithuania’s wine exports to Russia totalled USD 211 million.Several key factors are essential to understand the broader context in addition to raw numbers. Whilst wine accounts for 0.6% of total exports for Lithuania, it constitutes 4.3% of Georgia’s total exports and 9.2% of domestic exports. Furthermore, wine is not only economically significant for Georgia but also holds a higher socio-political importance as compared to Lithuania.It is important to note that wine is not included in the list of sanctioned products (except for certain expensive wines). Hence, an attempt to link Lithuania’s exports to Russia with sanctions is misleading. Moreover, Georgia’s wine exports to Russia would not be affected either if it were to join the sanctions imposed by the European Union.Wine is not the only product that Georgia and Lithuania trade with Russia. Lithuania’s trade turnover with Russia exceeded USD 9.7 billion in 2023, dropping to USD 2.7 billion in 2023. In contrast, Georgia’s trade turnover with Russia rose from USD 1.6 billion to USD 2.4 billion during the same period. The emphasis on wine exports highlights the manipulative nature of the discussion, given the aforementioned context.Lithuania was allegedly pressuring the Georgian government to impose sanctions on Russia according to the second half of the MP’s statement. However, this claim cannot be verified based on publicly available information. Thus, FactCheck refrains from engaging in discussion of evidence regarding this part of the MP’s statement and does not factor it into the verdict. Furthermore, no specific examples of pressure on Georgia to impose sanctions have been found in open sources.Overall, Lithuania has significantly reduced its economic ties with Russia, whilst Georgia has increased them, which becomes evident when examining foreign trade trends – context omitted in Nikoloz Samkharadze’s statement. Furthermore, linking wine to the issue of sanctions is manipulation in terms of foreign trade trends as wine is not a sanctioned product. Considering all of the above, FactCheck concludes that Nikoloz Samkharadze’s statement is HALF TRUE.
Analysis
A member of Georgia’s tenth convocation Parliament from the Georgian Dream political party, Nikoloz Samkharadze, posted on X: “A perfect example of double standards. The Lithuanian government was pressuring Georgia to impose sanctions on Russia, yet they sold more wine to Russia than Georgia did in 2023.”
Georgia exported wine totalling USD 259 million in 2023 with Russia accounting for USD 168 million of the aforementioned figure. Wine exports from Georgia reached record levels (in monetary terms) both globally and to Russia in 2023. Moreover, Russia’s share also set a record, representing 65% of total exports. Notably, Russia’s share in volume data was even higher, reaching 70% in 2023 due to the lower price of wine exported to Russia (USD 2.70 per litre as compared to the USD 3.35 average in other markets). This upward trend continued into 2024 with Russia’s share in wine exports rising to 68% in terms of value and 72% in terms of quantity as of January-October of this year.
Graph 1: Wine Exports (USD Million)
Source: National Statistics Office of Georgia
Lithuania exported a total of USD 247 million worth of wine in 2023, with 69 million litres worth USD 211 million were sold to the Russian market, suggesting that Russia accounted for over 85% of Lithuania’s wine exports, according to Comtrade data.
Graph 2: Lithuania’s Wine Exports (USD Million)
Source: Comtrade
Whilst it can be said that Lithuania sold more wine to Russia than Georgia, both in terms of value and quantity, based solely on the raw numbers, there are several key factors that help provide a clearer picture beyond the absolute data:
The share of wine in total exports for Georgia is 4.3% (and 9.2% in domestic exports), which is seven times higher as compared to Lithuania’s 0.6%.
Russia’s share in Georgia’s wine exports increased by ten percentage points in 2023, as compared to 2021, whilst for Lithuania it decreased by four percentage points.
Wine holds significant political and social importance for Georgia beyond its economic value.
Wine is not a sanctioned product and Georgia would be able to export it to Russia even if it were a member of the European Union.
Georgia’s trade turnover with Russia increased by 1.5 times whilst Lithuania reduced its trade turnover by 3.6-fold in the two years following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Russia imposed an embargo on Georgian products, including wine, in 2006. Russia was the main export market for Georgian wine at that time. The embargo was lifted in 2013 and Georgia has re-entered the Russian market on an expanded scale since then. Russia has consistently been the largest importer of Georgian wine over the 11 years following the embargo’s removal, including eight years when Russia’s share exceeded 50%. Georgia’s dependence on the Russian market reached 64% in 2022, marking the highest level since the embargo was lifted. Subsequently, this reliance grew to 65% in 2023 and further rose to 68% in January-October 2024.
Wine plays a much more prominent role in Georgia’s export structure than in Lithuania’s. Georgia’s total exports amounted to USD 6.1 billion in 2023 with wine accounting for 4.3% (USD 259 million). Furthermore, the share of wine in Georgia’s local exports was even higher at 9.2%. In contrast, Lithuania exported USD 42.6 billion worth of products in 2023 with wine representing only 0.6%, or USD 247 million, of the aforementioned figure.
Wine is not only economically significant for Georgia but also holds socio-political importance. The export of ferroalloys decreased threefold from USD 453 million to USD 180 million in 2023. A reduction of the same margin in wine exports would have likely led to greater dissatisfaction. Wine exports totalled USD 250 million, nitrogen fertilisers USD 281 million, ferroalloys USD 453 million and copper ores more than USD 1 billion in 2022. Despite the above, the Georgian government constantly emphasised the increase in wine exports with little attention given to the USD 1 billion income from copper ore exports. Additionally, annual subsidies are provided for grapes but not on nitrogen fertilisers or ferroalloys. Given the aforementioned factors, wine exports are more than just 4.3% of total exports for Georgia. The destination and volume of wine sales carry greater weight both economically and politically, thus Russia accounting for two-thirds of Georgian wine exports points to a large degree of dependence.
The country demanding Georgia to impose sanctions on Russia sells more wine to Russia than Georgia itself, according to the Georgian Dream MP. His statement could be interpreted as suggesting that Lithuania was violating the sanctions. However, none of the European Union’s sanctions packages include wine, except for certain expensive wines. Therefore, Lithuania’s export of wine to Russia does not represent a violation of the sanctions. Additionally, Georgia would also be able to legally export wine to Russia in the event of EU membership, given that Russia itself does not impose another embargo.
Wine is not the only product that Georgia or Lithuania trades with Russia, thus it is also crucial to consider the total trade turnover, the percentage of Russia’s share in the turnover and how these dynamics have shifted over time.
Whilst Georgia exported USD 657 million worth of products to Russia in 2023, Lithuania exported 3.5 times more at USD 2.3 billion. However, it is important to consider the of total exports. Russia accounted for 10.6% of total exports for Georgia, ranking fourth overall and constituting a leading destination for Georgia’s local exports, accounting for 19.4% (Russia would move to the fifth place in terms of exports and second place in terms of domestic exports, when considering the EU as a single market. Georgia’s total exports to the EU constituted USD 704 million, with domestic exports representing USD 576 million in 2023). In contrast, Russia was Lithuania’s sixth-largest export partner, with a share of 5.4%.
Lithuania’s exports to Russia amounted to USD 4.4 billion, making Russia Lithuania’s largest export partner with a 10.9% share in 2021, before the onset of the war. Georgia’s exports to Russia increased slightly from USD 610 million to USD 657 million during the same period.
The difference in the change in reliance on Russia is even more noticeable in case of imports. Lithuania has reduced its imports from Russia by 14.9 times, from USD 5.3 billion to USD 357 million, whilst Georgia has increased its imports by a factor of 1.7 since the war started. Whilst Georgia increased its trade turnover with Russia by 1.5 times, from USD 1.6 billion to USD 2.4 billion between 2021 and 2023, Lithuania reduced its trade turnover by 3.6-fold, from USD 9.7 billion to USD 2.7 billion during the same period.
Graph 3: Georgia and Lithuania’s Trade Turnover with Russia (USD Million)
Source: National Statistics Office of Georgia, Comtrade
Russia’s share in Lithuania’s trade turnover constituted 11.4% in 2021, dropping to 2.9% by 2023. In contrast, Russia accounted for 11.4% in Georgia’s trade turnover in 2021 and 11.2% in 2023. The slight percentage decrease was driven by an even higher increase in trade with other countries, given the overall monetary growth trend.
Graph 4: Russia’s Share in Trade Turnover
Source: National Statistics Office of Georgia, Comtrade
The MP’s statement did not just refer to Lithuania’s trade data – he claimed that Lithuania was pressuring the Georgian government to impose sanctions on Russia. Whilst there were periodic calls for sanctions, no specific examples of pressure on Georgia to impose sanctions have been found in open sources almost three years after the war began. Hence, FactCheck refrains from engaging in discussion of evidence regarding this part of the MP’s statement.
Georgia is not a member of the European Union unlike Lithuania and is not automatically bound to join the sanctions imposed by Brussels. Whilst Georgia has not imposed bilateral sanctions on Russia, it has taken steps to align with international efforts, such as blocking Visa and MasterCard cards issued in Russia. Notably, over 1,700 attempts of sanction evasion have been detected, according to Finance Minister Lasha Khutsishvili.
Although auto exports to Russia have nearly disappeared, the resumption of direct flights between Georgia and Russia was assessed with negative remarks. There were statements calling for sanctions and the European Parliament included a similar call in a resolution. However, there was no official demand for Georgia to impose bilateral sanctions, let alone any threats made.
Nikoloz Samkharadze’s claim that Lithuania was calling for Georgia to impose sanctions on Russia whilst simultaneously selling wine to Russia is absurd as wine is not included in the list of sanctioned products. Therefore, Lithuania’s sale of wine to Russia could not have been a violation of sanctions.
The MP’s statement is also manipulative in the aspect that he focused solely on one product (wine) whilst Lithuania drastically reduced its trade turnover with Russia in terms of value (both exports and imports) by 3.6 times, unlike Georgia. Furthermore, Georgia increased its trade turnover with Russia by 1.5-fold. Although Georgia marginally reduced Russia’s share in its trade turnover from 11.4% to 11.2% due to increased trade with other countries, Lithuania substantially reduced Russia’s share from 11.4% to 2.9%.
Given the accuracy of the statistical data presented in the statement, but the omission of other important facts that could lead to a misleading interpretation, FactCheck concludes that Nikoloz Samkharadze’s statement is HALF TRUE.
Editor’s Note
The initial version of this article assessed the statement as FALSE.
The article mistakenly cited statistics for sparkling wine for Lithuania, with their exports to Russia amounting to USD 62 million, instead of wine exports as a whole.
The statistical data was reviewed following interaction with a reader and confirmed that Lithuania’s wine exports to Russia totalled USD 211 million in 2023.
Despite the statistical inaccuracy, the broader context remains unchanged: Lithuania reduced its trade turnover with Russia by 3.6 times over two years, whilst Georgia increased it by 1.5 times; additionally, wine is not included in the list of sanctioned products and could still be exported to Russia even if Georgia had joined the sanctions.
Following the aforementioned correction, FactCheck revised its verdict. The final assessment of the article was adjusted to HALF TRUE. FactCheck concludes that whilst the statistical data cited in the politician’s statement are partially accurate, important details were omitted and the overall context of the issue is disregarded, which could potentially mislead the audience.